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What else can the School Board now decide it does not like?
How else will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending
children to school to be educated by the norms of the School
Board or are we educating our youth to shed the prejudices
of the past, to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our world’s problems?1
—Justice William O. Douglas
The past two years have seen a proliferation of state laws that restrict how race
may be discussed in public schools. Among other topics, these laws commonly ban
presentation of the viewpoint that the U.S. government—or legal system—is racist.
But such policies raise important First Amendment questions: while it is well accepted that school boards and state legislatures retain great discretion to promulgate
curricula, the exact scope of that authority is unclear. The Supreme Court case most
closely related to this question, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, addresses
only when school districts may permissibly regulate student speech in curricular
contexts. Hazelwood does not resolve the antecedent question of whether local educational authorities may constitutionally constrict the range of permissible political
viewpoints in curricula.
This Comment argues that existing doctrine supports recognizing a student
right to be free from political orthodoxy in public education. It proposes a burdenshifting test for vindicating that right. First, courts should evaluate whether curricular decisions restrict discussion of political viewpoints. Second, the government
should have the opportunity to show that the restriction serves a legitimate interest,
in part pursuant to the test laid out in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. Finally, plaintiffs should be able to prove that the government’s
restriction was based on impermissible animus. This Comment concludes by arguing that certain provisions in recently passed critical-race-theory laws should be
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Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S. 998, 999–1000
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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considered unconstitutional because they restrict political discussion without legitimate justification.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2020, Manhattan Institute fellow Christopher Rufo received a tip that the City of Seattle was conducting
“internalized racial superiority” trainings for city employees.
These trainings allegedly taught that “black Americans are reducible to the essential quality of ‘blackness’ and white Americans are reducible to the essential quality of ‘whiteness.’” 2 Rufo
later appeared on Fox News and called on President Donald
Trump to “ban such training in all federal departments.”3 His advocacy bore fruit: President Trump reportedly watched the
2
Adam Harris, The GOP’s ‘Critical Race Theory’ Obsession, THE ATLANTIC (May 7,
2021), https://perma.cc/2CZD-6FJZ (quoting Christopher F. Rufo, Cult Programming in
Seattle, CITY J. (July 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z7AW-CK2Y).
3
Id.
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program, contacted Rufo, and subsequently issued an executive
order prohibiting trainings advocating certain “divisive concepts”
from all federal programs.4 The executive order defined “divisive
concepts” to include views that “the United States is fundamentally racist or sexist” and that meritocracies are racist or sexist.5
The accompanying implementation memorandum suggested that
agencies might identify programs violating the executive order by
searching for phrases such as “critical race theory,” “systemic racism,” and “unconscious bias.”6
Several advocacy groups that provided trainings on issues of
race and gender sued the Trump administration, requesting a
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the executive order
impermissibly discriminated between viewpoints and thus violated the First Amendment.7 A federal judge granted the injunction, agreeing that the plaintiffs were “likely to prevail” on their
viewpoint-discrimination claim.8 But Rufo’s influence did not
abate. As of April 1, 2022, forty-two states had introduced bills or
taken other steps to regulate the discussion of race in public
schools.9
Many of these regulations parrot the language from President Trump’s executive order: Tennessee, for instance, prohibits
any public school from teaching that a “meritocracy is inherently
racist or sexist . . . [or that] [t]his state or the United States is
fundamentally or irredeemably racist or sexist.”10 It also prohibits
teachers from using supplemental materials that reference such
subjects.11 Two recently enacted Texas statutes stipulate that no
teacher or school authority may “make part of a course” the concept that meritocracies “are racist or sexist”12 or that, “with respect to their relationship to American values, slavery and racism

4
See id.; Santa Cruz Lesbian & Gay Cmty. Ctr. v. Trump, 508 F. Supp. 3d 521,
528 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,683, 60,683 (Sept.
22, 2020)).
5
See Santa Cruz, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,950, 85 Fed.
Reg. at 60,685).
6
Id. at 531.
7
See id. at 531–34.
8
Id. at 541–42.
9
Sarah Schwartz, Map: Where Critical Race Theory Is Under Attack, EDUC. WEEK
(Apr. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/LPF6-V65D.
10 S.B. 623, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51(a) (Tenn. 2021) (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(a) (2021)).
11 S.B. 623, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51(a) (Tenn. 2021) (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-1019(a)).
12 H.B. 3979, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 2021).
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are anything other than deviations from . . . the authentic founding principles of the United States.”13 An Arizona law provides
that school authorities “may not allow instruction in or make part
of a course” the idea that “an individual . . . is inherently racist,
sexist or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously” or
that “academic achievement[ ] [or] meritocracy . . . are racist or
sexist.”14 North Dakota recently passed a second critical-racetheory law prohibiting schools from including curricular instruction that “racism is systemically embedded in American society
and the American legal system.”15
These laws have already impacted U.S. education.16 Teachers
and administrators struggle to discern what exactly the laws restrict, forcing them to alter teaching strategies.17 School authorities have banned books such as A Raisin in the Sun, Their Eyes
Were Watching God, and Narrative of the Life of Frederick
Douglass from core curricula.18 Protests and lawsuits have proliferated on both sides of the issue.19
This is not the first time that U.S. school districts have served
as culture-war battlegrounds. In 1925, Tennessee science teacher
John Scopes was infamously prosecuted for teaching evolution in
violation of a state statute prohibiting instruction of “any theory
that denies the story of the divine creation of man as taught in
the Bible.”20 In 1974, the Board of Education of Kanawha County,

13

H.B. 40, 87th Gen. Assemb., 2d Called Sess. § 620.002(a)(10) (Tex. 2021).
H.B. 2898, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 15-717.02 (Ariz. 2021).
15 H.B. 1508, 67th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.D. 2021).
16 See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Texas Principal in Spotlight over Race Issues Agrees to
Resign with Paid Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/6V2L-5J9Q; Zack
Beauchamp, Did Critical Race Theory Really Swing the Virginia Election?, VOX (Nov. 4,
2021),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/11/4/22761168/virginia-governor
-glenn-youngkin-critical-race-theory.
17 See Fabiola Cineas, Critical Race Theory Bans Are Making Teaching Much
Harder, VOX (Sept. 3, 2021), perma.cc/7LKT-F8LY.
18 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 22, Black Emergency Response
Team v. O’Connor, No. 21-cv-1022 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 2021).
19 See id. at 12–22 (arguing that Oklahoma’s critical-race-theory law violates the
First Amendment). Compare Douglas Belkin & Jacob Gershman, Federal Lawsuits Say
Antiracism and Critical Race Theory in Schools Violate Constitution, WALL ST. J. (July 1,
2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-lawsuits-say-antiracism-and-critical-racetheory-in-schools-violate-constitution-11625151879 (discussing a federal lawsuit alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment stemming from a school’s diversity initiatives),
with Gabriella Borter, ‘Critical Race Theory’ Roils a Tennessee School District, REUTERS
(Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/critical-race-theory-roils-tennessee
-school-district-2021-09-21 (outlining local community resistance to the Tennessee law).
20 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363–64, 363 n.1 (Tenn. 1927) (finding “little merit”
in Scopes’s argument that he had a First Amendment right to teach evolution in schools
14
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West Virginia, voted to purchase textbooks preaching multiculturalism and atheism despite petitions to the contrary. As a result, “homes were firebombed, schools were dynamited, [and] gunfire was exchanged.”21 And if the events of the past are any guide
for what to expect in the future, the current dispute over critical
race theory is unlikely to be the last time that conflict emerges
over curricular decisions. Schools continue to serve as sites for
discussion of many of today’s “socially controversial”22 topics, such
as climate change23 and abortion.24
Despite the significant role that schools play in preparing
students for political conversation—and the controversy that
comes with it—the precise scope of local officials’ authority to regulate curricula is unclear. As the two of the most recent federal
appellate opinions on this question have noted, courts have
granted widely differing degrees of discretion to state officials
when regulating the content of curricula.25 The lack of doctrinal
clarity on the appropriate standard of judicial review to be applied
to curricular guidelines—along with heightened political polarization and ideological bent in classrooms26—makes the time right
for a clarification.

but overturning the conviction on a procedural issue); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (rejecting the Scopes holding nearly forty years later).
21 Norman B. Smith, Constitutional Rights of Students, Their Families, and Teachers
in the Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 389–90 (1988) (quoting Daniel M.
Schember, Textbook Censorship—The Validity of School Board Rules, 28 ADMIN. L. REV.
259, 259 (1976)).
22 See JOHN ROGERS, MEGAN FRANKE, JUNG-EUN ELLIE YUN, MICHAEL ISHIMOTO,
CLAUDIA DIERA, REBECCA COOPER GELLER, ANTHONY BERRYMAN & TIZOC BRENES,
UCLA’S INST. FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUC. & ACCESS, TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE AGE OF
TRUMP: INCREASING STRESS AND HOSTILITY IN AMERICA’S HIGH SCHOOLS 12–16 (2017),
https://perma.cc/B5SZ-6YL8 (noting that teachers have reported increased polarization in
classrooms).
23 See generally Jennifer Bleazby, Simone Thornton, Gilbert Burgh & Mary Graham,
Is Climate Change Education Ever a Form of Political Indoctrination? Pedagogical and
Epistemological Tools for Managing Climate Change ‘Controversy’ in the Classroom,
AUSTL. ASS’N OF RSCH. IN EDUC. CONF. (2021).
24 See David C. Wiley, Marina Plesons, Venkataram Chandra-Mouli & Margarita
Ortega, Managing Sex Education Controversy Deep in the Heart of Texas: A Case Study of
the North East Independent School District, 15 AM. J. SEXUALITY EDUC. 53, 55–58 (2020).
25 See Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that four
other circuits have taken different approaches to this question); Oliver v. Arnold, 19
F.4th 843, 859 (5th Cir. 2021) (Duncan, J., dissenting) (“Our law in this area is . . . a
dumpster fire.”).
26 See Andrew Atterbury & Juan Perez Jr., Republicans Eye New Front in Education
Wars: Making School Board Races Partisan, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2021)
https://perma.cc/R3ZE-3FLA; see also ROGERS ET AL., supra note 22, at 12–16 (noting that
teachers have reported increased polarization in classrooms).
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This Comment argues that existing First Amendment jurisprudence and important normative arguments provide support
for the recognition of a robust student right to receive a public
education that does not suppress viewpoints on matters of “politics, nationalism, . . . or other matters of opinion.”27 Part I explains why courts have historically granted broad deference to
state authorities to set curricula. Part II then outlines how existing First Amendment jurisprudence warrants heightened protection against government-mandated indoctrination of political orthodoxy through public school curricula. Part III attempts to
balance the competing interests of local educational authorities
and students by proposing a burden-shifting framework under
which plaintiffs can allege violations of the right to be free from
orthodoxy. Finally, Part IV uses the Tennessee critical-racetheory statute as a blueprint for how the proposed burdenshifting framework should work in practice.
I. DISCRETION OF LOCAL STATE ACTORS TO SET CURRICULA
While the critical-race-theory laws discussed in this Comment have been promulgated by state legislatures,28 it is worth
noting up front that—because this Comment focuses on students’
First Amendment rights—it makes no analytical difference
whether curricular decisions which cement education of politically orthodox viewpoints are made by state legislatures, school
boards, or school officials. School boards regulate public school
curricula via delegated state power,29 and teachers—as agents
employed by the state—are subject to the same First Amendment
limitations as state legislatures and school boards when restricting student speech rights.30 As a result, I use the term “local

27

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Schwartz, supra note 9.
29 See, e.g., Dye v. McKeithen, 856 F. Supp. 303, 307–08 (W.D. La. 1994) (“It is a
prerogative of the legislature to delegate to administrative boards and agencies of the
state. . . . [But] [t]he Board is authorized to do only those acts expressly or implicitly
granted to them by the legislature.”); W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Sch. Bd., 980 F.2d 253, 255
(4th Cir. 1992) (“[S]chool boards ‘possess and can exercise only those powers expressly
granted by the General Assembly.’” (quoting City of Richmond v. Confrere Club, 387
S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va. 1990))).
30 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267–70 (1988) (extending the principle that curricular determinations rest with the school board to cover actions
by a school principal); Collins v. Putt, 979 F.3d 128, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2020) (applying the
Hazelwood “school officials” framework to an action by a teacher); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva,
226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that school boards can be held liable for
28

2022]

The Constitutionality of Orthodoxy

1075

authorities” to refer to all local government actors interchangeably. This Part explains why those local authorities have historically received nearly unlimited discretion to regulate curricula,
and then it outlines the standard that is commonly applied in constitutional review of curricular decisions.
A. Support for Absolute Local Control over Curricula
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment—incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment—provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”31 While courts have consistently recognized that students32 do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”33 the prerogative to
determine curricular content is typically reserved to local authorities almost without limitation.34
The Supreme Court has recognized that “inculcation of [community] values is truly the ‘work of the schools.’ The determination of what manner of speech is . . . inappropriate properly rests
with the school board.”35 Courts have repeatedly emphasized that
school boards execute “important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,”36 which come with substantial community benefits. Aside from allowing localities to teach values of their choosing, “local control over the educational process affords citizens an
opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages

constitutional violations committed by their teachers if the teachers act in accordance with
a “policy, custom or practice established or approved by the board”).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32 Curricular restrictions also raise First Amendment concerns regarding teachers’
free speech rights in schools. These are important issues but are not the subject of this
Comment. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing “the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of [its] public services”).
33 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
34 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (“[School boards] might well
defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their
duty to inculcate community values.” (emphasis in original)).
35 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (quoting Tinker, 393
U.S. at 508); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 411 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[I]n the early 1800’s, no one doubted the government’s ability to educate and discipline
children as private schools did.”).
36 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). But see id. (admonishing that the board’s responsibilities must still be performed “within the limits of
the Bill of Rights”).
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‘experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.’” 37
Limited judicial interference with local school control also ensures that students will receive a well-structured and comprehensive education. Giving school authorities the power to set and enforce curricular limits—rather than allowing “teachers to teach
what they please”38—cements educational oversight in executive
bodies with the power to promulgate corrective policies. Further,
placing curricular control in the hands of elected, democratically
accountable school boards ensures that students will be taught
the values of the community rather than those of the unelected
judiciary.39
Local control over curricula is also consistent with the First
Amendment principle that “when the State is the speaker, it may
make content-based choices.”40 The Supreme Court, in a highly
criticized line of cases,41 has explained that “the Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program”
that expresses a viewpoint “without at the same time funding an
alternative program which” expresses an alternate viewpoint.42
Lower courts have extended this logic to the educational sphere,
explaining that schools—as state entities—are entitled to regulate the content of what is expressed when they speak.43
For the foregoing reasons, school authorities act with
largely unfettered discretion when making curricular decisions.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed what limitations—if any—are imposed on local curricular authorities by the
37 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)).
38 Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979)).
39 See Jason Persinger, Note, The Harm to Student First Amendment Rights When
School Boards Make Curricular Decisions in Response to Political Pressure: A Critique of
Griswold v. Driscoll, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 249, 269–70 (2011).
40 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
41 See, e.g., Jason A. Kempf, Viewpoint Discrimination in Law School Clinics: Teaching Students When and How to “Just Say No”, 70 MO. L. REV. 247, 252 (2007) (highlighting
that these cases “introduced a significant amount of confusion into this area of First
Amendment law”).
42 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
475 (1977) (“There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.”).
43 But see Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 695, 702 (2011) (outlining a tension between prohibiting viewpoint discrimination
when the government restricts speech but allowing viewpoint discrimination when the
government is the speaker).
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First Amendment. As a result, courts have struggled to demarcate how much partisan or ideological bent may be baked into
public curricula.44
B. The (Assumed) Current Standard: Hazelwood
Lower courts frequently apply the standard outlined in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier45 when evaluating state curricular decisions.46 Hazelwood dealt with a school principal’s decision to delete two articles—describing teen pregnancy and
parental divorce—from a school newspaper produced by a high
school journalism class.47 The Court upheld the principal’s action,
explaining that the student newspaper was part of the school’s
curriculum48 and that, under certain circumstances, school authorities may constitutionally restrict student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities.49
The Court explained that allowing school authorities to restrict students’ expression in curricular settings serves three important functions: (1) ensuring that students learn the intended
lessons, (2) protecting other students from “material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity,” and (3) preventing the
speaker’s views from being erroneously attributed to the school.50
The Hazelwood Court held that these factors may outweigh student speech rights, allowing school authorities to censor student
expression in the classroom when the restriction is based upon
“legitimate pedagogical concerns.”51
Hazelwood addressed only “whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
speech” in curricula,52 concluding that school officials may limit
student speech pursuant to the pedagogical purpose of a

44 See, e.g., Oliver v. Arnold, 19 F.4th 843, 859 (5th Cir. 2021); Arce v. Douglas, 793
F.3d 968, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that circuits have reached different conclusions on this question).
45 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
46 See, e.g., ACLU of Fla. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1200 (11th
Cir. 2009) (addressing “curricular decision[s] entitled to deference under the Hazelwood
decision”).
47 Hazelwood, 484 U.S at 263.
48 Id. at 269.
49 See id. at 273.
50 Id. at 271.
51 Id. at 273.
52 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71 (emphasis added).
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legitimate curriculum.53 Essentially, this means that schools may
discriminate along content-based lines when evaluating student
speech in curricular contexts such as in essays, test responses,
and school newspaper articles. Hazelwood indicates that when
students receive poor grades for nonresponsive answers to essay
prompts, they may not allege violations of their First Amendment
rights so long as the bad grade was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.54
Hazelwood thus answered a narrow question: Under what
circumstances may school authorities regulate student speech in
curricular contexts such as school newspapers, exams, and
essays? Contrary to its subsequent use by several appellate
courts,55 Hazelwood did not answer the question posed by this
Comment: What limits does the First Amendment place upon
state actors when making curricular determinations? First,
Hazelwood promulgates conditions under which state actors may
restrict student speech, not outer limits on state speech in the
closed school environment.56 Second, Hazelwood does not resolve
whether state actors may regulate curricular speech along
viewpoint-discriminatory lines.57
Because applying the Hazelwood standard of review to all
curricular decisions stretches the holding substantially beyond its
53 See Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 100 (2008) (arguing that “the
notion that Hazelwood’s standard applies to all school-sponsored speech,” as opposed to
only student speech, “reflects a misreading”).
54 Cf. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 (reasoning that a school may distance itself “from
speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences”). Hazelwood
still leaves some close calls on this point. See, e.g., Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent.
Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 620–23 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing a school that rejected a poster
depicting Jesus as the only way to save the environment); Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
53 F.3d 152, 153–54 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing a teacher who rejected a student’s paper
on Jesus in response to an assignment requiring students to research an “interesting, researchable and decent” topic).
55 See, e.g., ACLU of Fla., 557 F.3d at 1200.
56 See Waldman, supra note 53, at 94 (“[O]nce Hazelwood is interpreted as applying
to the speech of students, teachers, and outside entities, it is not possible to reach a uniform, workable answer to the viewpoint-discrimination question.” (emphasis in original));
see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (articulating a fear that the
majority’s broad standard would allow school officials to “camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics”).
57 See Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint
Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 219
(2004); Peck, 426 F.3d at 631–32 (explaining that the content-discrimination issue “has
been the subject of much debate among Circuit Courts, which have reached conflicting
conclusions”).
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intended scope, it has largely served as a rubberstamp for curricula. Part II will explain why existing free speech jurisprudence
supports applying a far more stringent standard of review for curricular determinations.
II. EXISTING FOUNDATIONS OF A RIGHT TO RECEIVE
INFORMATION FREE FROM ORTHODOXY
While local authorities typically have broad discretion to regulate school environments, students retain substantial free
speech rights even in school contexts.58 These include important
rights that are ancillary to speech, such as a limited right to receive information59 and a right to remain silent when schools
mandate speech expressing a political viewpoint.60 The Court has
also explained that free speech rights take on unique contours in
educational settings. Schools, unlike other government actors,
must be able to mandate certain types of speech—and restrict
others—to achieve the legitimate curricular goals61 outlined by local authorities. However, in Board of Education v. Pico,62 a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated a limit on the discretion
of school authorities to regulate content in schools. The Pico Court
held that school authorities may not constitutionally censor selected books from public school libraries “in a narrowly partisan
or political manner.”63
While Pico was expressly limited to a school board’s authority
to remove certain books from school libraries, the Court’s precedents—and underlying First Amendment principles—justify articulating a broader restriction on the state’s prerogative to select
viewpoints when promulgating curricula.
A. Pico and the Right to Receive Information
The right to receive communicated speech is now an established
piece
of
free
speech
jurisprudence.64
In
58

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 757 (1976).
60 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 761, 789 (2012) (“Barnette [ ] self-consciously created a new ‘right not to speak,’
rather than simply applying existing First Amendment doctrine.”).
61 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
62 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
63 Id. at 870.
64 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (1976) (“[W]here a speaker exists, . . .
the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients.”).
59
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,65 the Court explained that the Free Speech Clause
implies a right to receive information in certain circumstances,
including receipt of advertising and of mail.66 The right to receive
information rests on the notion that “[t]he dissemination of ideas
can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not
free to receive and consider them.”67
In Pico, the Supreme Court recognized that students have a
right to receive information in school libraries.68 A plurality of the
Court ruled that a school board could not remove books from a
school library simply because it considered the books “antiAmerican, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy.”69
While the Pico ruling was replete with caveats70 and ostensibly
limited to its facts,71 the Court held that the state may not constitutionally “contract the spectrum of available knowledge” in
school libraries.72 Such restrictions can—even in schools, typically
subject to unencumbered state regulation—violate “the right to
receive information and ideas.”73
The Pico Court built upon the right to receive information
recognized in other contexts. It explained that the right to receive
information is, in two ways, “an inherent corollary of the rights of
free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”74 First, the right to receive information “follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send [ideas].”75
Second, the Pico Court recognized the right to receive ideas as a
“necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his

65

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 757.
67 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
68 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (“[W]e have held that in a variety of contexts ‘the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas.’” (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969))).
69 Id. at 857.
70 See id. at 869 (“[School boards] might well defend their claim of absolute discretion
in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values.” (emphasis in original)).
71 See id. at 862 (explaining that the holding “does not intrude into the classroom, or
into the compulsory courses taught there. Furthermore, even as to library books, the action before us does not involve the acquisition of books. . . . Rather, the only action challenged in this case is the removal from school libraries of books” (emphasis in original)).
72 Id. at 866 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
73 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564).
74 Id.
75 Id. (emphasis in original).
66
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own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”76 The Pico plurality explained that students must be exposed to disparate viewpoints because “access [to diverse ideas] prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often
contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”77
The Court ultimately ruled that there was an unresolved question
of whether the library books had been removed for legitimate educational reasons or pursuant to partisan whim, and the Court
sent the case back to the district court for further fact-finding.
Thus, although the Pico plurality opinion nominally limits
the right to receive information to the school library context, it
hints at a more expansive right to receive information free from
orthodoxy in public schools.78 Indeed, the Pico Court split over
whether its limitation on school authorities’ discretion to restrict
available information along partisan lines ought to extend beyond
library books to classroom information. While the plurality cabined its holding to investigation of whether library books had
been removed for partisan gain, Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence argued that courts ought to apply a broader principle:
[T]he State may not suppress exposure to ideas—for the sole
purpose of suppressing exposure to ideas. . . . [C]ertain forms
of state discrimination between ideas are improper. In particular, our precedents command the conclusion that the State
may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state
officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political
reasons.79
Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality for limiting its holding
to school libraries.80 He argued that receipt of ideas—free from
partisan taint—is crucial for students’ future exercise of political
freedom81 and that “students may not be regarded as closedcircuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to

76 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt
ed., 1910)).
77 Id. at 868; see also Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1031
(9th Cir. 1998) (“It cannot be disputed that a necessary component of any education is
learning to think critically about offensive ideas—without that ability one can do little to
respond to them.”).
78 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
79 Id. at 878–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
80 See id. at 879 (“[The unique] environment [of the school] makes it particularly
important that some limits be imposed [on educational discretion].” (emphasis in original)).
81 Id. at 879–80.
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communicate.”82 To allow otherwise would risk turning “stateoperated schools” into “enclaves of totalitarianism.”83
Justice Blackmun argued that suppression of dissidence is
the precise evil that the First Amendment prohibits.84 He also explained that if one of the justifications for local curricular discretion is value inculcation, “allowing a school board to” eliminate
certain books from curricula based solely on a distaste for the “political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them” is counterproductive.85 It “hardly teaches children to respect the diversity
of ideas that is fundamental to the American system.”86 Justice
Blackmun’s opinion represents the view—rejected by the majority of the Justices—that suppression of political discussion in
classrooms, not just libraries, raises special First Amendment
concerns.
B. Compelled Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination
Strands of First Amendment jurisprudence other than the
right to receive information support extending into classrooms
the Pico right to access information free from partisan filter. This
approach finds support in Cold War–era precedent limiting viewpoint discrimination in schools. A useful example of this principle
is Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of
New York,87 in which the Court evaluated a New York statute that
required removal of civil service and public school employees from
membership in groups that advocated overthrow of the government by unlawful means or for “treasonable or seditious” utterances.88 The Court held that the New York law violated the First
Amendment because it was unconstitutionally vague, chilling the
discussion of dissenting viewpoints.89 It also noted that these
vagueness concerns were especially significant in university
82 Id. at 877 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511). This logic also underlies Establishment Clause cases. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (holding that states
may not prohibit teaching evolution); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584, 597 (1987)
(explaining that the state cannot require teachers to discuss creationism because students
are impressionable and school attendance is involuntary).
83 Pico, 457 U.S. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511).
84 See id. at 882 (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials.” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638)).
85 Id. at 879–80.
86 Id. at 880.
87 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
88 Id. at 596–97.
89 Id. at 604.
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classrooms, which served as important sites for discussion of politically relevant ideas.90 In the Court’s view, the law did not make
it clear whether teachers could, under the statute, “carr[y] a copy
of the Communist Manifesto on a public street.”91 The Court explained that because the New York law restricted the breadth of
available knowledge in society—and universities in particular—
it replaced the ability “to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding” with “authoritative selection.”92 Keyishian thus set down the oft-cited principle that the
First Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”93
If, per Keyishian, schools may not take political ideology into
account when making employment decisions, may they require
that those teachers instruct politically orthodox content? Subsequent decisions have not clearly established when schools can
make viewpoint-based distinctions in curricular determinations.94
One situation in which schools clearly cannot prescribe orthodoxy is when compelling student speech expressing political viewpoints. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,95
the Court ruled that a school policy mandating that students salute the flag during the Pledge of Allegiance “transcends constitutional limitations on [local authorities’] power and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”96 The Barnette Court held that the compelled salute functioned to “coerce acceptance of [a] patriotic creed”97 and explained
that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.
. . . If there are any circumstances which permit an exception,
they do not now occur to us.”98
Subsequent opinions on compelled school speech have explained that while a student may sometimes be “forced to speak
90

Id. at 603.
Id. at 599.
92 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957)).
93 Id.; see also Epperson, 393 U.S. at 105 (affirming the language from Keyishian).
94 See Arce, 793 F.3d at 982–83 (explaining that courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether Hazelwood allows viewpoint discrimination when schools restrict
student curricular speech).
95 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
96 Id. at 642.
97 Id. at 634.
98 Id. at 642.
91
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or write on a particular topic even though the student might prefer a different topic,” public schools “may not demand that a student profess beliefs or views with which the student does not
agree.”99 Local school authorities may not require the utterance of
a particular message, because such action “pose[s] the inherent
risk that the Government seeks . . . to suppress unpopular ideas
or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion.”100 This shows that concern over compelled speech is based on the deeper concern that the government
may create an echo chamber devoid of dissent. This logic supports
expanding the anti-indoctrination underpinning of the Court’s
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in compelled speech to
curricular development. If the goal of the Barnette compelledspeech doctrine is to prevent the state from “strangl[ing] the free
mind at its source,”101 a similar doctrine ought to apply to the
state’s monopoly on authority to disseminate viewpoints in
schools. As Professors Stephen Arons and Charles Lawrence have
explained, “The requirement that the school’s attitudes be accepted with silent consent [is] no less a coercive ritualistic confession than a flag salute. It [is] no less a denial of [ ] students’ first
amendment rights. [Such students are] being trained to be passive, docile, self-denying individuals.”102
C. Justifying Heightened Protection for Political Viewpoints
This Comment seeks to extend Barnette’s protection against
orthodoxy in politics, nationalism, and analogous “matters of
opinion” to state curricular speech. Cabining judicial review to
curricular decisions that impact these categories of speech—
which I hereinafter call “political speech”—serves an important
function: it protects the prerogatives of school officials to regulate
obscene, indecent, or unambiguously harmful speech.103

99 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). This is also the
logic underlying the robust application of the Establishment Clause in school settings. See
generally Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (striking down a statute that prohibited teaching evolution in schools).
100 C.N., 430 F.3d at 187 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
641 (1994)).
101 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
102 Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A
First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 331 (1980).
103 See S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights, and
Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 149–50 (1995).
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Although evaluating whether curricular determinations fall
within the ambit of the Barnette categories may seem like a difficult task, political speech already receives special protection under the First Amendment.104 Distinguishing between political and
nonpolitical speech105 is necessary—and good—because, as the
Supreme Court has explained,106 the democratic system is best
served by “free political discussion, to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people.”107 Heightened protection for speech designated as political comes with greater skepticism for government action that risks “excising a particular point
of view.”108 Landmark free speech decisions have explained that
laws that restrain criticism of the state are antithetical to the
First Amendment,109 while “speech on public issues occupies the
‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” 110
Three jurisprudential theories are offered as justifications for
the First Amendment: the “search for truth,” self-governance, and
self-fulfillment rationales.111 The first two provide special support
for heightened protection of political speech in schools. The
“search for truth” approach conceptualizes the First Amendment
as a guarantee that the marketplace of ideas will remain free
from restriction, facilitating an uncensored pursuit of “living
truth.”112 This theory gains force when considered in tandem with
the second philosophical justification for First Amendment protections, which is the promotion of self-government.113 As Professor Alexander Meiklejohn famously argued, political speech ought
to be specially protected because a self-governing system relies on

104

See id. at 147.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
604–06 (explaining that “[t]he distinction between political and nonpolitical speech” is difficult but “serves a central function of the first amendment”).
106 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (explaining that political speech is
protected in schools); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (calling political speech
“the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect”).
107 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
108 Sunstein, supra note 105, at 610.
109 See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (“[I]t is a prized American privilege
to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions.”).
110 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (first quoting NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); and then quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
467 (1980)).
111 GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V.
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1014–18 (8th ed. 2018).
112 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33–84 (1859).
113 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948).
105
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the ability of an informed citizenry to “pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness.”114 In Professor Cass Sunstein’s words,
“[t]he right to free speech . . . is a precondition for [democracy],”
which means that regulation of political speech should be “subject
to the strongest presumption of unconstitutionality.”115
The U.S. education system should be responsive to the democratic function of the First Amendment.116 The Supreme Court
has explained that “[t]he classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace
of ideas’” because “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth.”117 While some might argue that education
of children requires orthodoxy “imposed by conscious selection on
the part of government officials,”118 three counterarguments point
to the contrary. First, as Judge Richard Posner explained, if
“eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is obvious that they
must be allowed the freedom to form their political views . . . before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when
they first exercise the franchise.”119 Second, youth are capable of
critical political thought—showcased today through youth activists like Greta Thunberg and Malala Yousafzai—and it is a crucial function of schools to facilitate the development of that
skill.120 Finally, the position that the First Amendment tolerates
suppression of political speech in schools is simply antithetical to
the First Amendment’s protection of free thought: “In the absence
of different perspectives and a wide range of information, the system cannot function. It will fail to expose errors of fact. It will fail

114

Id. at 26.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–22 (1993).
116 See Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School
Reform: Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in America’s Public
Schools, 50 UCLA L. REV. 959, 973 (2003) (explaining the deeper critique that if schools
“expose children only to values and ideas that buttress the status quo and legitimize the
position of those in power, it is unlikely that those who are presently oppressed will learn
the cause of their oppression or the means of overcoming it” (quoting Arons & Lawrence,
supra note 102, at 322–23)).
117 Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
118 See Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, the Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 23, 65 (1989).
119 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original).
120 See Welner, supra note 116, at 982 n.106 (arguing that youth are capable of political thought and that schools should promote critical thinking).
115
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to shed the kind of light that comes only from diverse perspectives
about public issues.”121
D. Discerning Political Viewpoints
The premise that speech on political issues deserves heightened protection in schools raises an obvious question: What qualifies as a political viewpoint that is deserving of protection in
classrooms?122 The Barnette Court answered this question
categorically, holding that schools may not compel speech on “politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”123 Other
areas of First Amendment doctrine rely on similarly categorical
approaches, assigning heightened protection to speech on matters
of public concern.124 This Comment adopts the Barnette approach:
curricular decisions that restrict viewpoints on matters of politics,
nationalism, or other matters of public opinion should be looked
upon with judicial skepticism. Two similar cases—with opposite
results—help illustrate the Court’s approach to such content.
First, in Pickering v. Board of Education,125 the Court considered a school board’s dismissal of a teacher for writing a letter
that criticized local educational tax policy to a local newspaper.
While the Court recognized that the state, as an employer, has an
interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees, it also noted
that the public has a great interest in “free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”126 The Court explained that
Pickering’s speech did not jeopardize “either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers” and that even if his
allegations could be shown to be false, they were not “per se detrimental to the district’s schools.”127 Conversely, Pickering, as a
teacher, had an interest in speaking on the allocation of funding
to schools. Because Pickering’s speech did not inhibit the everyday operation of schools and contributed to discussion of a matter

121

SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 22.
See id. at 148 (“How, for example, are we to treat the work of the controversial gay
artist Robert Mapplethorpe, or rap music, or nude dancing?”).
123 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
124 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–
61 (1985) (disapproving of punitive damages for libel when the speech is on a matter of
“public concern”); Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 913, 928 (expressing reluctance to
criminalize a boycott related to “public issues”).
125 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
126 Id. at 573.
127 Id. at 570–71.
122
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of public concern, the Court held that he could not constitutionally be discharged from his post.128
In Connick v. Myers,129 the Court evaluated an assistant district attorney’s claim that she had been unconstitutionally discharged after circulating a questionnaire concerning internal
office affairs such as “office transfer policy, office morale, the need
for a grievance committee, [and] the level of confidence in supervisors.”130 The Court explained that Pickering intended to minimize the risk that speech on public issues might be “chilled” by
fear of discharge for expressing unpopular viewpoints.131 Surveying the post-Pickering progeny, the Court explained that if the
speech causing firing “cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for [the
Court] to scrutinize the reasons for [the public employee’s] discharge.”132 The Court went on to note that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement.”133 Because it found that the attorney’s questionnaire
was intended to stir up controversy—rather than legitimately
evaluate the performance of workplace duties134—and that the
questionnaire would “disrupt the office, undermine [ ] authority,
and destroy close working relationships,” the Court held that the
attorney could be fired consistent with the First Amendment.135
Pickering and Connick reveal that while determining what
constitutes political speech—or speech on a public issue—may be
difficult, it is required by the First Amendment.136 They also show
that context matters. For instance, a schoolteacher like Pickering
might receive heightened protection for speech on school funding,
while a disgruntled employee like Connick may not foment discontent under the guise of public concern. Connick also shows
that while some speech (like the office questionnaire) might plausibly be construed to address matters of public concern, such
128

See id. at 574–75.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
130 Id. at 141.
131 Id. at 145.
132 Id. at 146.
133 Id. at 147–48.
134 Connick, 461 U.S. at 149–50 (noting, however, that one of the questions was related to a matter of public concern).
135 Id. at 154.
136 See id. (“Our holding today is grounded in our long-standing recognition that the
First Amendment’s primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public
concern.”).
129
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speech can be restricted if its primary purpose or effect is to
undermine the orderly function of the workplace. Phrased differently, the degree of protection assigned to nominally political
speech—or speech on a matter of public concern—can vary based
on the interest that the government, as an employer, has in ensuring the smooth functioning of its services. Because the central
function of public education is to create young adults capable of
participation in politics,137 the First Amendment should protect
any speech that can be presented without substantially disrupting the educational process.138
Some may counter that providing heightened protection for
political speech fails to provide clear delineation of what exactly
ought to be subject to increased judicial protection. This argument counters that what may be considered a political viewpoint
by some—for instance, whether climate change is real or whether
Donald Trump legitimately won the 2020 election—might be considered a factually closed question by others. In Sunstein’s words,
“[T]hese questions are unhelpful. There is no way to operate a
system of free expression without drawing lines.”139 The Barnette
and Pickering Courts—as well as countless others—eschewed
this line-drawing question in favor of provided heightened protection to political viewpoints.140 Courts evaluating regulation of curricular content should do the same. As Professor Kevin Welmer
has noted, the rise of Hazelwood’s broad deference to democratic
authority over curricular content “has blinded courts to . . . Barnette and Keyishian. Gone are Meiklejohn and Mill. The new rubric, as applied, leaves no room for such considerations as academic freedom and the marketplace of ideas.”141
E. Support from First Amendment Values
The Pico plurality explained that local authorities have a
“duty to inculcate community values” in the “compulsory environment of the classroom” but not in the secondary environment of
the school library.142 This claim raises the question: Why does a
state’s monopoly on the ability to speak in the classroom grant it

137

See supra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.B.
139 SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 149.
140 See Welner, supra note 116, at 982 n.106 (“[T]he First Amendment simply does
not sanction the position that no freedom is better than limited freedom.”).
141 See id. at 1008.
142 Pico, 457 U.S. at 869.
138
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unfettered discretion to promote any viewpoint that it chooses at
the expense of others?
Normative arguments support a broad interpretation of the
student’s right to be free from orthodoxy in schools. First, an influential article by Professor Tyll van Geel has called into question whether value inculcation actually plays the stabilizing and
civic-culture-supporting function that courts seem to assume it
does.143 Expression and discussion are crucial to wise and efficient
decision-making because they allow for consideration of alternative lines of thought and action—perhaps better fulfilling the objective of promoting civic virtue than narrow propagation of certain values.144
And contrary to the position taken by the Pico plurality, these
arguments gain force in the curricular context as compared to in
society at large. While the government may typically discriminate
between viewpoints when it is the speaker,145 it occupies a unique
position as the facilitator of classrooms because it is the only
speaker with access to those spheres.146 “Public schools are, in
many ways, an indoctrinator’s dream. [ ] [A]ttendance is compulsory, and students lack the independent knowledge or psychological sophistication necessary to evaluate critically what their
teachers tell them.”147 Cries to protect students from “influences
or perspectives which may injure or disquiet them” inevitably
have the secondary effect of making students unprepared to deal
with those issues beyond the school context.148 Indeed, in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.,149 the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed that schools are important institutions for the free exchange of ideas because they teach the value of free speech.150 Because schools facilitate this marketplace of ideas, they “have a

143 See Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 247, 262–80 (1983) (noting that the formation
of a belief “is the first stage in the process of expression.” (quoting THOMAS EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 21–22 (1970))).
144 See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First
Amendment Law, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 437 (2019).
145 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
146 See Walter A. Kamiat, Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-state
Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 497, 514–15 (1983).
147 Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Orthodoxy”: Value
Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 21.
148 See id. at 23.
149 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
150 See id. at 2046.
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strong interest in ensuring that future generations understand
the workings in practice of the well-known aphorism, ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it.’” 151 The Court’s language from Mahanoy implies that the
normative logic underpinning the First Amendment justifies a
heightened standard of review for curricular decisions that risk
enforcing political orthodoxy.
III. A BURDEN-SHIFTING TEST FOR EVALUATING THE RIGHT TO
BE FREE FROM ORTHODOXY
To ensure that students develop into free-thinking, politically
capable adults, courts should apply a heightened standard of review152 to curricular determinations that restrict dissenting viewpoints in matters of “politics, nationalism, [ ] or other matters of
opinion.”153
Prior commentators have proposed various doctrineclarifying alternatives. Some are highly suspicious of local government and seek to restrict transmission of community values
absent a compelling governmental interest.154 And many deal narrowly with compulsion of student speech.155 However, prior scholarship has not provided a framework for how courts should limit
state curricular discretion based on students’ implied right to receive information free from orthodoxy.
No framework for evaluating First Amendment implications
of curricular determinations will provide bright lines and easily

151

Id.
Some scholars have analogized the Hazelwood standard to rational basis review
in the equal protection context. See, e.g., Marielle Elisabet Dirkx, Big Brother Is Reading:
An Examination of the Texas Textbook Controversy and the Legacy of Pico, 17 U.C. DAVIS
J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 29, 60–61 (2013) (criticizing Pico’s progeny for being overly deferent to
local content censorship).
153 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. Barnette also lists religion as deserving of special protection, but religious content in public schools is subject to an independent category of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103 (holding that states
may not prohibit teaching evolution), so it has been omitted from this list.
154 See Nancy Tenney, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Reality in Public School
Curricula: Untruths About Homosexuality as a Violation of the First Amendment, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 1599, 1633–35 (1995) (proposing a new, six-factor balancing test based on
First Amendment principles); see also Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You
Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational
Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 95 (2002).
155 See, e.g., Joseph J. Martins, The One Fixed Star in Higher Education: What Standard of Judicial Scrutiny Should Courts Apply to Compelled Curricular Speech in the Public University Classroom?, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 99–101 (2017) (outlining a framework
to determine when compelled speech violates the First Amendment).
152
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administrable rules. The tension underlying the conflict between
the necessary role played by school authorities in regulating curricula and the importance of the right to be free from orthodoxy
in education “demonstrates only that the problem here is a difficult one, not that the problem should be resolved by choosing one
principle over another.”156 The following framework will attempt
to balance the necessary role that school authorities fill in regulating education with the fundamental importance of an education that contains multiple viewpoints on topics essential to
healthy civic discourse. Courts should first evaluate whether the
challenged curricular policy restricts a viewpoint on a matter of
politics, nationalism, or a similar issue of public opinion. If it does,
the state entity should have an opportunity to defend its policy by
showing that the suppressed speech either lacks pedagogical
value or would substantially disrupt orderly school function. Finally, plaintiffs should be able to allege that the legitimate steptwo justification was actually pretext for animus or partisan gain.
A. Step One: Petitioners Must Show That State Action
Restricted Discussion of Politics, Nationalism, or Another
Matter of Opinion
To establish a prima facie case that school authorities have
violated a student’s right to receive information free from ideological orthodoxy, the first step of the burden-shifting test should be
for the plaintiff to show that a state curricular decision restricted
discussion of politics, nationalism, or an analogous matter of opinion. As Part II explained, judicial review of policies that impede
speech on such topics is consistent with Supreme Court precedent
on the right to receive information and on viewpoint discrimination in the context of school-compelled speech as well as the
heightened protection for speech on matters of public concern.
This Section outlines the functional rationale behind this prong
of the test before addressing some powerful counterarguments.
1. Functional justifications.
Because political viewpoints deserve heightened protection in
curricula, courts should evaluate whether curricular decisions restrict speech on such topics. The foundational inquiry ought to be
whether the curriculum allows for fair discussion of disparate

156

Pico, 457 U.S. at 881–82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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political viewpoints—not whether it affirmatively provides space
for every political viewpoint to be taught.157
While it is tempting, at this phase of the analysis, to distinguish between censorship and prescription of curricular content,
this distinction falls apart upon closer examination. Restrictions
of political viewpoints might come in the form of obvious bans—
e.g., school policies that teachers may not instruct that gun control is good—or curricular mandates that chill dissenting viewpoints. To use an extreme example, a school policy requiring that
teachers instruct using the Democratic Party platform would
likely chill curricular discussion of alternate viewpoints: A rigid
curriculum that allocates “the school’s finite [educational] resources”158 to one set of political views expresses a clear sentiment
that the opposing views are disfavored.159 It would indicate hostility toward nonorthodox views and would discourage Republican
teachers or students from expressing their ideas.160 While “[t]he
school’s finite resources—as well as the limited number of hours
in the day—require that education officials make sensitive
choices between subjects to be offered and competing areas of academic emphasis,”161 such constraints should not be understood
as a justification for school officials to instruct only politically orthodox viewpoints. A requirement that schools refrain from teaching just one side of politically controversial subjects hardly imposes an unmanageable burden on local educational authorities;
to allow otherwise would impede the abilities of students to grow
into critical-thinking participants in U.S. democracy.
Some might argue that judicial review of curricular policies
that restrict viewpoints on politics, nationalism, or other matters
of public opinion would lead to lawsuits against any social studies
curriculum that touches on a controversial issue, such as a discussion of the invasion of Iraq or the history of affirmative action.
There are three responses to this. First, not every curricular decision on a social studies topic will restrict dissident viewpoints.
Fact-based descriptions of events or opinions can be distinguished
from policies that actively promote one viewpoint on an issue of
157

Teach every view is a practical impossibility.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159 Cf. Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 1982) (“The board
has used its official power to perform an act clearly indicating that the ideas . . . are unacceptable and should not be discussed or considered. This message is not lost on students
and teachers, and its chilling effect is obvious.”).
160 In practice, this should be a fact-specific inquiry.
161 Pico, 457 U.S. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
158
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political concern at the expense of another. Second, even if applying this standard were to result in increased litigation, the benefits would outweigh the costs. School actions already serve as
common subjects for First Amendment litigation,162 and impeding
judicial economy is a price well worth paying to provide an unconstrained education on matters of politics. Finally, overbreadth at
this phase of analysis is acceptable. While not every curricular
decision that deliberately chills speech should be considered to
violate the First Amendment, a broad standard at the initial
phase of the test serves a “smoking out” function, allowing courts
to further examine policies that risk violating students’ First
Amendment rights.
Further, focus on the chilling effects created by curricular decisions would prove workable in practice. Courts are accustomed
to evaluating chilling effects; suits alleging them are said to overcome many common “discretionary rules of judicial abstention,”163
showing that the procedural issues with the standard—including
standing—have been litigated and resolved. Because restrictions
that chill protected First Amendment speech must cause “immediate and real injury,”164 courts have clear standards with which
to evaluate pleadings. This also provides plaintiffs with a clear
standard for alleging violations of the right to be free from political orthodoxy.
Two brief examples show how this standard could work in
practice. First, in Keyishian, the Supreme Court found that a New
York law prohibiting teachers from expressing dissidence unconstitutionally chilled speech that would have “trained [students]
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth.”165 Similarly, Pratt v. Independent School District
No. 831166 evaluated a school board’s removal of print and cinematic presentations of “The Lottery” from the curriculum. “The
Lottery” is a short story in which “the citizens of a small town
randomly select one person to be stoned to death each year.”167
Three students protested the removal of the film version of the
story, alleging a right to “be free from official conduct that was
162 A Westlaw search for “school” and “First Amendment” revealed several hundred
cases between January 1, 2021, and January 1, 2022, alone. WESTLAW,
http://www.westlaw.com (search “school” and “First Amendment”).
163 Nat’l Student Ass’n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
164 Id. at 1111.
165 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
166 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
167 Id. at 773.
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intended to suppress the ideas expressed in these films.”168 The
Eighth Circuit found that “[t]he board ha[d] used its official power
to perform an act clearly indicating that the ideas contained in
the films are unacceptable and should not be discussed or considered. This message is not lost on students and teachers, and its
chilling effect is obvious.”169 While Pratt was decided prior to Pico,
the Eighth Circuit’s opinion centered on the idea that an official
action that expresses disapproval of political ideas serves to inhibit discussion of those ideas, which cannot be done absent a
“substantial governmental interest.”170 As such, the court ruled
that the restriction unconstitutionally interfered with “the right
to receive information and to be exposed to controversial ideas—
a fundamental First Amendment right.”171
The policies at issue in both Keyishian and Pratt had the effect—regardless of aim—of suppressing valuable ideas, and the
courts recognized this as raising serious constitutional concerns.
These examples show that a narrow focus on a law’s effect at the
initial phase of analysis would allow courts to identify policies
that raise indoctrination concerns. While Keyishian and Pratt
both ultimately concluded that the restrictions were unconstitutional, such determinations should not be inevitable, as I explain
in Part III.B.
This standard will inevitably lead to difficult cases in which
the chilling effect of the law is unclear. For example, in Griswold
v. Driscoll,172 Justice David Souter—sitting on the First Circuit—
ruled that a decision by a Massachusetts school commissioner to
“revise an advisory ‘curriculum guide’ . . . in response to political
pressure” did not violate the First Amendment.173 The commissioner initially approved a textbook referring to “the Armenian
genocide” before acceding to a request made by a local Turkish
group for a revision of the curriculum excluding references to genocide.174 A collection of students, parents, and teachers claimed
that removal of the “contra-genocide references” violated their
First Amendment rights to be free of viewpoint discrimination.175
Justice Souter explained that the board’s revision of the
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 776.
Id. at 779.
See id.
Pratt, 670 F.2d at 779.
616 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 55–56.
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curricular guide did not violate the First Amendment in part because the revised guide was merely advisory.176 In Justice Souter’s
words, “[T]he terms of the Guide allow teachers to look beyond it,
and its directions to sources with a particular point of view are
not meant to declare other positions out of bounds in study or discussion.”177 This language shows Justice Souter’s awareness that
if the advisory revision were to chill dissident speech, it might
violate the First Amendment—but it survived constitutional
scrutiny by refraining from declaring certain viewpoints
out-of-bounds.178
2. Reverse-chilling-effect counterarguments.
Focusing on the effect of the state’s action on political viewpoints comes with compelling normative benefits. As Professor
Leslie Kendrick has explained, policies that chill speech raise constitutional questions because First Amendment rights are “preferred value[s], such that, when [they] conflict[ ] with other state
values . . . [they] must receive more weight.”179 This is especially
true in schools, where—in the words of the Second Circuit—
“[u]nder the guise of beneficent concern for the welfare of school
children, school authorities, albeit unwittingly, might permit
prejudices of the community to prevail.”180 The same Second Circuit opinion also explained that a board’s regulation of speech in
classrooms “may be no more than the fulcrum to censor only that
expression with which it disagrees.”181 Because of the fundamental importance of primary education in preparing students to be
“active participants in a democracy,”182 the First Amendment
standard for evaluating regulations that restrict the ability of students to discuss particular ideas should be more stringent than
rubberstamping any curriculum “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”183
176

Id. at 59.
Driscoll, 616 F.3d at 59.
178 Some have criticized Griswold for allowing partisan influence to permeate curricular determinations. See, e.g., Persinger, supra note 39, at 262–70. But, assuming an
elected school board, this perspective fails to acknowledge that any curricular determination will inevitably be the result of politics. Thus, the appropriate focal point should not
be on the origin of the policy but on the effect that the policy has on dissenting viewpoints.
179 Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1633, 1650 (2013).
180 James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1972).
181 Id.
182 See Tobin, supra note 57, at 241.
183 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
177
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One counterargument is that increased judicial review of curricular decisions will itself chill the discussion of important ideas
in schools. This concern was articulated by Monteiro v. Tempe
Union High School District,184 in which the Ninth Circuit rejected
a plaintiff’s suit against a school board alleging that certain books
(including The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn) caused psychological harm because they used racially derogatory language.185 In
evaluating the complaint, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiff’s request for the court to enjoin the use of certain books
squarely conflicted with both the school board’s discretion to set
curricula and other students’ rights to receive information.186
While the court avoided the question of whether a school board
may constitutionally ban books from curricula,187 it correctly
noted that judicial censorship of assigned books could “have a significant chilling effect on a school district’s willingness to assign
books . . . that might offend the sensibilities of any number of persons or groups.”188
To avoid this concern, judicial focus on chilling effects from
state curricular determinations should not allow lawsuits against
school authorities for content that makes plaintiffs uncomfortable
or with which they do not agree. Plaintiffs should not be able to
allege an infringement on their right to receive information from
the assignment of books expressing unpopular views unless
assignment of those books can be shown to actively chill the expression of alternate ideas. As Justice Brennan explained in his
Hazelwood dissent, “[T]he state educator’s undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate moral and political values is
not a general warrant to act as ‘thought police’ stifling . . . advocacy of all but the official position.”189 Policies that promote
particular viewpoints but have neutral effects on dissenting viewpoints should be considered constitutional—but statutes that
suppresses alternate viewpoints should not.
Proponents of the recent race-discussion laws argue that critical race theory—which they argue is being taught in schools
now—marginalizes certain dissenting viewpoints by branding
184

158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1024–32.
186 See id. at 1027–29.
187 Id. at 1029 (“Because ours is not a case in which a school board has decided on the
basis of its own evaluations to remove literary materials, we need not now decide the
question.”).
188 Id. at 1030.
189 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 285–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185
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them as racist.190 If a court determines that a curricular decision
to teach critical race theory sidelines dissenting political views,
that decision should be considered a prima facie violation of students’ rights.
B. Step Two: State Responses
While the exchange of ideas in the classroom plays an important role in facilitating the development of critical-thinking
skills in soon-to-be participants in the democratic process, it is
undisputed that inculcating community values is the purview of
local school authorities.191 As a result, if a plaintiff is able to make
a prima facie showing that a state authority has chilled presentation of particular viewpoints in schools, the state should then
have the opportunity to show that its policies were legitimate. It
should be able to do this in two ways.
1. Application of Tinker.
School authorities should be able to justify their curricular
determinations under another flagship case in the school speech
sphere, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.192 The Court in Tinker held that school authorities could not
suspend students for wearing black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War absent a special showing of harm to the educational
process.193 Specifically, Tinker established that schools may restrict student speech only when it “materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”194 This framework intends to simultaneously protect student
speech rights and preserve the discretion of school authorities to
“maintain order and discipline in [ ] schools.”195
While the Tinker holding specifically addressed when school
authorities may restrict student expressive conduct in
190 See, e.g., Steve Piet, Opinion, Critical Race Theory Is Itself Racist, POST REGISTER
(Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.postregister.com/opinion/guest_column/opinion-critical-race
-theory-is-itself-racist/article_f1f91e4c-328b-5153-97b6-94f70d625091.html.
191 See supra Part II.
192 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Justice Blackmun’s Pico concurrence also proposes using
Tinker as the operative standard. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
193 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
194 Id. at 513. Some commentators have interpreted this language to mean that student speech should not be confined to speech approved by school authorities. See, e.g., Julie
Goyer, Student First Amendment Rights in the Public School Setting: A Topic of Increased
Litigation, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 163, 177 (1982).
195 James, 461 F.2d at 571.
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noncurricular contexts, its standard has been applied to other
areas of school speech as well. For example, the Second Circuit
applied the Tinker standard to analogous teacher speech,196 and
the Third Circuit used it to resolve a teacher’s complaint that internal school communications could not be permissibly regulated.197 Tinker should be further extended to the context of curricular development. School board curricular policies that chill
political speech198 should be upheld upon a state showing that the
speech that is allegedly chilled would cause substantial disruption to school function if it were permitted in the classroom.
School authorities should receive deference on whether curricular
instruction would cause substantial disruption in different age
groups. For instance, robust discussion of torture or slavery might
be inappropriate for elementary students.
Tinker does not allow school authorities to restrict speech
solely to “avoid the controversy which might result from the expression.”199 This logic is consistent with the rationale underlying
the Free Speech Clause more broadly: “Any variation from the
majority’s opinion . . . may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom . . . that is
the basis of our national strength.”200 It is worth noting that while
Tinker seeks to embrace the discomfort that comes with ideological heterogeneity, it does not require proof of imminent disorder
to justify restricting speech in schools.201
Recent cases evaluating school racial-harassment policies illustrate how the Tinker standard works in practice. Courts have
generally held that anti-harassment policies are constitutional
196

See id. (applying Tinker to a teacher’s political expression).
Policastro v. Kontogiannis, No. 4-2883, 2005 WL 1005131, at *2–3 (3d Cir. Jan.
12, 2005).
198 Other commentators have proposed similar approaches to regulation of speech in
curricular contexts. See Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First
Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 732 (1990) (proposing
that school boards may restrict teachers’ speech only when it would “substantially disrupt
the educational process”); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he
school board must ‘be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.’” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509)).
199 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510.
200 Id. at 508–09 (citation omitted) (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S.
1 (1949)).
201 See, e.g., James, 461 F.2d at 572 (explaining that Tinker does not require school
authorities to “wait until disruption is on the doorstep before they may take protective
action”).
197
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when school authorities can point to facts indicating that the restricted speech would cause conflict and can show that the restrictions are narrowly targeted at restricting that speech. For instance, in Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of
Education,202 the Third Circuit held that a history of racial tension in a school—including a white student attending school in
blackface with a noose around his neck and other students observing “White Power Wednesdays”203—justified a policy restricting “racially divisive” materials. However, the court explained
that the policy could not be used to censor a shirt that celebrated
“redneck” humor.204 The Third Circuit explained that in order to
restrict student speech, school authorities “must point to a particular and concrete basis for concluding that the association [between the restricted material and violent disruption] is strong
enough to give rise to well-founded fear of genuine disruption in
the form of substantially interfering with school operations or
with the rights of others.”205
Pursuant to Tinker’s progeny, school authorities should have
to point to specific facts particular to the effect of the restricted
speech to justify chilling the content. If the speech-chilling policy
is based a “well-founded expectation of disruption,”206 it is justified. For instance, students using hate speech directed at particular individuals would likely disrupt the learning environment in
a way that justifies prophylactic restriction under Tinker.207 In
this way, the Tinker standard protects the discretion of local authorities to create educational environments free from threats
and epithets but does not provide discretion to create educational
environments free from political controversy. This understanding
of Tinker is also consistent with the useful theoretical distinction
between speech that has political consequences and speech that
is political for constitutional purposes.208 While face-to-face racial
harassment, for instance, might have political consequences, it
does not meaningfully contribute to discourse on a matter of

202

307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 247.
204 Id. at 249–50 (noting that the policy permitted display and discussion of such materials “when selected and used to enhance knowledge” in classrooms).
205 Id. at 257.
206 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001).
207 The Court has recognized that speech directed at certain individuals or groups,
which may incite violence, may receive less protection than public speech. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
208 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 153.
203
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public concern and thus should be subject to reduced constitutional protection.209
The Tinker prong of the test can be used to resolve concerns
that a heightened First Amendment standard for curricular restrictions will allow teachers to exceed the bounds of their teaching mandate. Teachers that fail to adequately teach the legitimate curriculum clearly “materially disrupt classwork” and cause
“substantial disorder” to the smooth operation of the school. As
Justice Brennan noted in his Hazelwood dissent, “the essence of
the Tinker test” is to assure educators that “participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach.”210 Incorporation of the Tinker test ensures that curricular restrictions intended to induce compliance with educational standards will be
upheld, and that students may not assert First Amendment violations for low marks on nonresponsive assignments.211
It is worth noting that a “heckler’s veto”—in which a hostile
audience responds negatively to speech, creating a substantial
disruption—should not justify censoring curricular viewpoints on
issues of politics, nationalism, or other matters of public opinion.212 The benefits resulting from discussion of unpopular ideas
substantially outweigh the abstract risk of retaliation. As the
Tinker Court noted, “discomfort and unpleasantness [ ] always accompany [ ] unpopular viewpoint[s].”213 Popular ideas tend not to
raise the threat of a heckler’s veto for the simple fact of their popularity. As a result, it is primarily unpopular ideas that “strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as [they] press[ ] for acceptance of an idea.”214 Allowing heckler’s vetoes to justify censorship of particular viewpoints would
result in disproportionate promotion of majority-accepted ideas,
creating substantial risk of indoctrination.
This raises the question of how school authorities should deal
with potential displeasure from audiences resulting from curricular determinations. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in

209

See id.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211 See id.
212 See generally Katherine M. Porter, Comment, Tinker’s Timeless Teaching: Why
the Heckler’s Veto Should Not Be Allowed in Public High Schools, 86 MISS. L.J. 409 (2017);
see also Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5 (disapproving of censorship of a speaker solely on the
grounds that the speech might incite violence).
213 Tinker, 344 U.S. at 509.
214 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
210
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Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,215 the proper solution to a
hostile audience is not “to sacrifice freedom upon the alter [sic] of
order, and allow the scope of our liberty to be dictated by the inclinations of the unlawful mob.”216 Instead, school authorities
should seek to regulate the mob. If parents are likely to riot because they believe that schools are teaching critical race theory,
the state’s solution should not be to outlaw the curricular material; instead, it should be to prevent the parents from rioting—
or, at least, prevent the rioting from impeding the educational
process.
Again, this standard does not mandate that every unpopular
viewpoint be taught. Parents ought to have democratic recourses
to control curricula: they should be able to lobby for policies that
promote certain viewpoints, so long as promotion of those viewpoints does not come at the expense of dissenting viewpoints.
2. Inverted Hazelwood framework.
State educational authorities should also be able to justify
challenged curricular determinations by showing that the restricted speech lacks pedagogical value. This is an inversion of the
relatively permissive Hazelwood framework, which ordinarily
places the burden of proof on plaintiffs to prove that the school
authorities’ restriction of curricular speech bore no relationship
to a legitimate pedagogical concern.217 The framework ought to be
reversed—placing the burden of proof on states to prove that the
restricted political speech lacks pedagogical value—because of
the foundational First Amendment assumption that “unwise
ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones.”218
In practice, courts have already outlined certain enclaves of
speech that do not deserve First Amendment protection in
schools. For instance, school authorities can act to prohibit teachers from making sexual remarks about students.219 Similarly,
speech that is obscene,220 racially harassing,221 or advocates drug
215

370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1275.
217 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
218 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 26.
219 See, e.g., Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that a teacher who made in-class comments about rumors that two students had engaged
in sexual activities on the school tennis court could be disciplined by the school without
violating the First Amendment).
220 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680–86 (1986).
221 See Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 243.
216
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use222 may be permissibly regulated by schools.223 The unique
school context makes these categories of speech deserving of reduced protection.
This standard raises difficult questions when applied to disputed facts. In an era of intense political polarization, facts themselves are commonly disputed by political groups.224 Consider an
example: Would a state legislature violate the First Amendment
if it were to pass a law stipulating that no teacher may teach that
Joe Biden won the 2020 presidential election? Presumably so—as
the Court explained in Pico, “If a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written
by or in favor of Republicans, few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the students denied access to
those books.”225 What if a state legislature passed a law prohibiting biology teachers from instructing that life begins at conception, citing concern over factual inaccuracy? Both policies intend
to prevent the teaching of material that state authorities have
deemed to be factually inaccurate, and courts have generally held
that restrictive actions are legitimate when taken for “concerns
about [factual] accuracy.”226 But both also restrict viewpoints discussing political issues in classrooms.
Disputed facts can hold significant pedagogical value. In fact,
a recent empirical study found that open classroom discussion of
“charged” topics, relating to hotly contested issues, correlates
with “increased political efficacy, interest, tolerance, and
knowledge.”227 As such, courts should not uphold viewpoint restrictions based on factual concerns unless the restricted material
is clearly and demonstrably false, a stringent burden on the state
actor. This is because “[i]t is the special task of [the educational
222

See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007).
It is worth noting that application of this standard should vary depending on the
age of the children involved. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“[W]hether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns will depend on, among other things, the age and sophistication of the students.”).
224 See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 899
(2010) (noting the apparent “increasing and unfortunate acceptance of factual falsity in
public communication”); Kei Kawashima-Ginsberg & Rey Junco, Teaching Controversial
Issues in a Time of Polarization, 82 SOC. EDUC. 323, 323 (2018) (explaining that U.S. political polarization has made students “less likely to hear diverse opinions in their
networks”).
225 Pico, 457 U.S. at 870–71.
226 ACLU of Fla. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009);
see also Driscoll, 616 F.3d at 55–56.
227 Judith L. Pace, How Can Educators Prepare for Teaching Controversial Issues?,
85 SOC. EDUC. 228, 229 (2021).
223
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system] to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn,
make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion.”228
If a school authority believes that curricular materials regarding issues of political concern present factual inaccuracies,
its primary remedy should be to encourage teaching the alternative and discussion of the merits of the ideas—not to impose curricular policies that chill discussion of dissenting viewpoints. As
Justice Blackmun’s Pico concurrence notes, “positive educational
action,” which seeks to “instill certain values ‘by persuasion and
example,’” is the “converse of an intentional attempt to shield students from certain ideas that officials find politically
distasteful.”229
C. Step Three: Proof of Pretext
1. Arce and the importance of the third step.
If the state is able to prove that the challenged curricular provision served a constitutionally permissible purpose, the third
step of the burden-shifting test should be for plaintiffs to argue
that the curricular restriction was actually motivated by animus
or partisan gain. Allowing plaintiffs to allege that the defendant’s
second-step justification is pretext is common in similar burdenshifting tests.230 Courts are accustomed to dealing with allegations of pretext because they are frequently made under the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green231 burden-shifting framework
in Title VII cases.232 Additionally, courts are accustomed to evaluating claims of impermissible animus in the Fourteenth

228
229

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Pico, 457 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.

at 640).
230 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (articulating
a three-step burden-shifting test in Title VII cases in which the final step is for a plaintiff
to show that the employer’s stated reason for alleged discrimination was pretextual).
231 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
232 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2516–17 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If you are a lawyer, you know that [the burden-shifting] test looks utterly ordinary.
It is the sort of thing courts work with every day.”). But see Timothy M. Tymkovich, The
Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (2008) (arguing that subsequent cases
using the McDonnell-Douglas framework have returned analysis to a traditional “sufficiency of the evidence standard” and articulating four major issues with the current
approach).
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Amendment context.233 Even if the underlying justification for the
restriction does not rise to the level of impermissible racial animus prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, courts still (infrequently) strike down statutes when based on a bare desire to
harm.234
As an example of why the pretext analysis is important, consider the recent Ninth Circuit case Arce v. Douglas.235 The Tucson
school board added Mexican American Studies (MAS) classes to
its curricula in 1998 and later expanded the program under a federally enforced desegregation decree in an effort to create a “culturally relevant curriculum.”236 “Arizona state superintendents of
education, in the belief that MAS was being perverted into a program for promoting ethnocentrism and reverse racism,” sponsored and subsequently implemented legislation that eliminated
the MAS program.237 The legislation prohibited public schools
from including courses that were “designed primarily for pupils
of a particular ethnic group”—and neither party disputed that the
statue was enacted with the intention of eliminating the MAS
program.238
At trial, the district court first noted that the statute did not
infringe on the students’ classroom speech rights and was directed narrowly at restricting curricula.239 It then explained that
the law implicated the students’ right to receive information pursuant to Pico.240 Citing Pico and Monteiro, the court agreed that
the students’ right to hear imposed “limits upon the power of the
State to control even the curriculum and classroom,” and that
“curricular restrictions are at least subject to some degree of

233 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)
(finding that a zoning ordinance was based on “irrational prejudice” against those with
intellectual disabilities); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking
down a statute because “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest”).
234 See, e.g., Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–38.
235 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015).
236 Id. at 974.
237 Id. at 973–75.
238 Id. at 977. Notably, the statute exempted “courses that include discussion of ‘controversial aspects of history’ or that teach historical oppression of a particular ethnic
group.” Acosta v. Huppenthal, No. CV 10-623, 2013 WL 871892, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8,
2013) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-112(E), (F) (2013)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
and remanded sub nom. Arce, 793 F.3d 968.
239 Acosta, 2013 WL 871892, at *4.
240 Id. at *4–5 (“[S]tudents share the same ‘right to receive information and ideas’ as
other citizens generally do.” (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 861, 867–68)).
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scrutiny.”241 Applying Hazelwood, the district court granted summary judgment to the state on the statute’s provisions against
teaching “overthrow of the United States government,” promoting
“resentment toward a race or class of people,” and “advocat[ing]
ethnic solidarity.”242 However, it found no independent legitimate
pedagogical objective served by the statute’s section prohibiting
classes “designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic
group” and explained that because it threatened to chill the teaching of ethnic studies, it violated the students’ rights to receive information.243 Accordingly, the district court granted summary
judgment to the students on that provision.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. It also ruled that the
district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ viewpointdiscrimination claim prematurely due to a procedural error and
remanded for further fact-finding on both the viewpoint discrimination issue and a separate equal protection claim.244 On remand,
the district court explained that otherwise legitimate curricular
restrictions are unconstitutional if they “in fact serve to mask
other illicit motivations.”245 It found, based on a litany of evidence
(including anonymous racist blog posts by State Senator John
Huppenthal, then chairman of the Senate Education
Accountability and Reform Committee),246 that the pedagogical
values proffered by the state were pretext for racial animus.247 It
also concluded that the restriction was made only for political
gain without consideration of the pedagogical merits of the
program, independently constituting impermissible viewpoint

241 Id. at *5–7 (distinguishing this case from cases in which teachers alleged First
Amendment infringement because teachers have “no First Amendment right to influence
curriculum” whereas, “[i]n this case, the students do not actively seek to speak for the
government, but instead seek to vindicate their passive right to be exposed to information
and ideas” (quoting Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016–17 (9th
Cir. 2000))).
242 Id. at *7–10.
243 Id. at *8.
244 Arce, 793 F.3d at 986–90.
245 Gonzalez v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948, 972 (D. Ariz. 2017).
246 Id. at 962–63 (explaining that Huppenthal had written that “[t]he MexicanAmerican Studies classes use the exact same technique that Hitler used in his rise to
power” and “[t]he infected [MAS] teachers are the problem” (quoting Transcript of
Proceedings, Bench Trial Day 2, at 98, Gonzalez, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948 (No. 10-cv-623))).
247 Id. at 972 (summarizing evidence of animus in enacting the statute).
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discrimination.248 As a result of its finding that pretext undergirded the statute, the court declared it unconstitutional.249
The arc of Arce provides an example for how my proposed
burden-shifting framework ought to function, with some modifications. If the policy chills discussion from certain viewpoints—
as the district court found that the Arizona statute did250—plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that state authorities are
imposing orthodoxy on classrooms. The school board should then
bear the burden of articulating reasons why the burdened information either serves no pedagogical value or would cause substantial disorder in the school environment. This phase of the test
is the biggest departure from the analysis in Arce: while the Arizona district court only required the government to articulate a
legitimate pedagogical purpose to justify its restriction, a heightened burden on the government would appropriately protect the
student’s right to be free from politically orthodox education,
which is inadequately protected by current doctrine. Finally,
plaintiffs should be able to prove that the otherwise legitimate
restriction was made pursuant to impermissible animus. If a case
makes it to this phase of the test, extensive fact-finding may be
required—as the district court’s lengthy opinion after remand
from Arce reflects251—but such analysis is necessary to preserve
the “right to be free from official conduct that [is] intended to suppress [ ] ideas.”252
2. Pretext analysis functions well in this framework.
The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework has not
been immune from criticism. One particularly pointed critique
has come from Chief Judge Timothy Tymkovich of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Chief Judge Tymkovich has criticized the McDonnell-Douglas pretext framework under the logic
that, “[b]y dividing the presentation of the evidence into three
stages, the ultimate fact of discrimination can easily become
lost.”253 Fortunately, this concern can be easily resolved under this

248 See id. at 974 (noting that the record revealed “a fixation on winning a political
battle against a school district” and “a desire to advance a political agenda by capitalizing
on race-based fears”).
249 See id.
250 See Acosta, 2013 WL 871892, at *10.
251 See generally Gonzalez, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948.
252 Pratt, 670 F.2d at 776.
253 Tymkovich, supra note 232, at 521.
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Comment’s approach. Chief Judge Tymkovich’s concern is that
courts may lose track of evidence introduced in the first part of
the test—in which plaintiffs must allege a prima facie case of discrimination—when evaluating the ultimate claim of pretext because the two steps are so closely related.254 Here, the two parts
are clearly discrete: the former is a simple inquiry into whether
the law has a chilling effect, while the latter deals with the motives behind the suppression. Because the test avoids introduction of overlapping evidence in two different phases, it avoids the
criticism levied by Chief Judge Tymkovich.
Another important criticism is that it may not always be easy
for courts to distinguish between restrictions of content and restrictions of viewpoint. This issue is highlighted by Peck ex rel.
Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District,255 in which a kindergarten student was assigned a poster project depicting “simple
ways to save the environment.”256 Antonio Peck created a poster
showing a robed figure, representing Jesus, bent in prayer, surrounded by phrases such as “the only way to save our world” and
“God’s love is higher than the heavens.”257 After the school decided
not to display the poster and requested that Antonio create another, the Pecks filed a lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment to the school board, and the Second Circuit reversed. It explained that “drawing a precise line of demarcation
between content discrimination . . . and viewpoint discrimination
. . . is, to say the least, a problematic endeavor”258 and remanded
to the district court for inquiry into whether the government had
restricted Antonio’s viewpoint without a compelling governmental interest.259 In other words, the constitutional question was the
motivation behind the school district’s action.
This is a serious issue. Determinations of motive are inherently difficult260 but are fundamental to many areas of First
Amendment law.261 While an ultimate inquiry into the intent

254

Id.
426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005).
256 Id. at 620.
257 Id. at 622.
258 Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
259 Id. at 629–33.
260 See Kendrick, supra note 179, at 1681 (explaining the “difficulty of isolating the
role of intent” in seeking to prevent a chilling effect).
261 See id. at 1635–36 (explaining that First Amendment protection of speech—such
as incitement, defamation, and distribution of child pornography—requires evaluating the
speaker’s mindset).
255
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behind a curricular determination may raise pragmatic difficulties, none exceed the issues that courts already face when evaluating criminal mens rea or discriminatory intent.262 If the cost
that must be paid for free discussion of political issues in schools
is expenditure of judicial resources evaluating intent, it is a price
worth paying.
IV. APPLICATION TO TENNESSEE’S LAW
Because effective participation in the political process is one
of the fundamental values underlying the students’ right to receive ideas in schools—and the First Amendment more generally263—courts should serve as a backstop against imposition of
orthodoxy. This Comment has articulated a burden-shifting
framework that attempts to give greater weight to the student’s
right to receive an education free from orthodox political indoctrination than is provided by existing doctrine. While state and local
authorities must wield broad discretion to prescribe curricula, the
existing Tinker standard paired with an inversion of the Hazelwood framework provides adequate protection for local
prerogatives.
Application of the proposed framework to Tennessee’s curricular race-discussion law clarifies how the test would work in practice. The initial inquiry ought to be whether the statute restricts
expression of dissident viewpoints on a subject of politics, nationalism, or another matter of public opinion. Facially, it appears
that the law would restrict such viewpoints. The statute stipulates that local educational agencies (school boards) may not “include or promote . . . as part of a course of instruction or in a curriculum or instructional program, or allow teachers or other
employees . . . to use supplemental instructional materials that
include or promote” concepts such as “[t]his state or the United
States is fundamentally or irredeemably racist or sexist.”264
This should, in practice, be a fact-specific inquiry: if the state
punishes teachers for discussing political viewpoints with students or if curricular offerings are restricted because they discuss
those ideas, the law has a chilling effect on discussion of political
262

See id. at 1644 n.40 (surveying cases evaluating mental states in other areas of law).
See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 255 (1961) (“Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in
theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”).
264 S.B. 623, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51(a) (Tenn. 2021).
263
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concepts. Because the statute says that the enumerated concepts
may not be discussed in a curriculum or via supplemental materials, I assume that the law will have such an effect. Like the
curricular policy at issue in Arce, this law impedes the abilities of
students in Tennessee public schools to discuss concepts of race
that are relevant to national political dialogue. To borrow the language from Connick, the “content, form, and context of a given
statement”265 impacts whether speech should be protected as political. Current public discourse on this question indicates that it
should be.
Tennessee should then be able to counter that the chilled
speech either lacks pedagogical value or substantially disrupts
the orderly function of schools per Tinker. One provision of the
law stipulates that no teacher may teach that “[Tennessee] or the
United States is fundamentally or irredeemably racist or sexist.”266 It does not seem likely that discussion of this material
would disrupt the ordinary function of schools. To be sure, postTinker cases have made it clear that schools can restrict materials
that cause racial tensions. But the Supreme Court also clearly
explained that Tinker does not authorize prophylactic action
based on a vague concern of school disruption.267 In order to restrict speech, school authorities must articulate a “particular and
concrete basis”268 for anticipating harm, pointing to facts that
“might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.”269 It seems unlikely that Tennessee could do this with regards to speech on racially biased elements of U.S. political
society.
Next, the inverted Hazelwood standard places an onerous
burden on the state to show that there is no redeeming pedagogical value to the censored content. This should be an uphill battle.
The ability to criticize the state is one of the fundamental underpinnings of the Free Speech Clause.270 While teaching that the

265

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
S.B. 623, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51(a)(8) (Tenn. 2021).
267 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
268 See Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 257.
269 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also James, 461 F.2d at 572
(explaining that the school board had not shown that a teacher wearing a black armband
would cause disruption).
270 Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that the First
Amendment limits libel actions by public officials); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
266
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U.S. political system is racist beyond repair might lack meaningful teaching value, articulating the argument that certain elements of the system are imbued with racial bias does not. Serious
scholars,271 public figures,272 and even Supreme Court Justices273
have argued that elements of U.S. society are fundamentally racist. This Comment does not evaluate whether they are right or
wrong, and neither should judges. Rather it asks—just as a judge
should—whether materials articulating such a viewpoint lack all
pedagogical value. They do not.
Other elements of the Tennessee law might survive First
Amendment scrutiny pursuant to the Tinker standard. For instance, the statute’s provision that teachers may not instruct that
“one race or sex is inherently superior to another” seems as
though it might have the prophylactic effect of combatting racebased violence, which would certainly cause substantial disorder
in schools.274 Another of the statute’s provisions, prohibiting assignment of “character traits, values, moral or ethical codes . . . to
a specific sex or race,”275 could be upheld under Tinker if the state
authorities could show that such ideas substantially interfere
with the abilities of students to learn.
Because it seems unlikely that the state can carry its burden
under the second part of the test with regards to its prohibition
on criticism of the state, we likely do not need to evaluate whether
the legitimate step-two justification was pretext for animus or
partisan gain. However, it is worth reiterating that an otherwise
content-neutral curricular restriction can be made unconstitutional by underlying animus or by motivation for political gain

18–20 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment protected the defendant from conviction
for wearing a jacket stating “Fuck the Draft”).
271 See generally, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Koichi Hioki, Race and
Retribution: An Empirical Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 839 (2019).
272 See, e.g., Bill Chappell, ‘We Are Not Cured’: Obama Discusses Racism in American
with Marc Maron, NPR (June 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/76Q2-NQBH (“[T]he legacy of
slavery, Jim Crow, discrimination in almost every institution of our lives. . . . [T]hat’s
passed on. We’re not cured of it.” (quoting Episode 613 – President Barack Obama, WTF
WITH MARC MARON (June 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/X8XT-XBHY).
273 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“McCleskey’s claim [that race impacted his death sentence] is not a fanciful product of mere statistical artifice.”).
274 See West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366–67 (10th Cir. 2000)
(upholding, under Tinker, a school board provision prohibiting racial harassment due to
ongoing racial tensions).
275 S.B. 623, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51(a)(11) (Tenn. 2021).
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instead of focus on actual pedagogical concerns.276 The statute in
Arce was passed only after its sponsor made some remarkably
racist remarks, and the law was eventually invalidated on those
grounds. While I doubt that similar evidence is available for the
Tennessee law, investigation into pretextual purpose should be
the final step of a First Amendment analysis. Even existing doctrine makes it clear that curricula may not be established for narrow partisan gain,277 and elimination of explicit partisan orthodoxy should be the fundamental goal of any renewed focus on the
application of the First Amendment to curricular development.
As the Supreme Court explained in 1943, “The very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy.”278 Today’s courts should play a
proactive role in the enforcement of the Bill of Rights, to ensure
that tomorrow’s leaders are prepared to engage in such political
controversy. In the famous words of Justice Louis Brandeis, “If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”279

276

See, e.g., Arce, 793 F.3d at 982.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 870–71 (explaining that a Democratic school board may not constitutionally ban all books by Republicans).
278 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
279 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
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